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General Public Policy and
Development Strategy
The Chinese state in perspective
Chen Sheying
1 The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  seek  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  China’s
development and the role of public policy by addressing some fundamental theoretical
and practical issues1. A comparative perspective is provided by reflecting on the idea of
the welfare state in developed nations and revisiting and contrasting the case of the
Chinese economic state2. Arguing that Third World experience is under-represented in
social  policy  studies  at  the  same  time  as  the  focus/emphasis  on  the  “social”  or
“welfare” in public policy may have contained a Western bias, the article reintroduces
analytical framework of a policy system conceived by Robert Morris3. The long neglect
by policy study of a guide to the priority aims and preferred means of a policy system is
shown, and we highlight a recent groundbreaking effort to identify different general
public policy patterns which dismiss the welfare state as the paradigm for public and
social  policy  study.  The  difference  between general  public  policy  and  development
strategy is made clear, and the true meaning of a “developmental state” is clarified
under the new comparative framework. A historical perspective is further presented by
illuminating  the  processes  of  politicisation  and  de-politicisation  of  the  Chinese
economic  state  that  has  always  zigzagged  between  developmental  and  non-
developmental paths4. There is a need for people to monitor and prevent government
public  policies  from  following  non-developmental  paths,  as  it  is  important  within
economic development for both economic and welfare states to learn from each other
as  they  constantly  rebalance  their  policy  foci.  Implications  for  China’s  future
development are discussed.
Welfare state and social policy
2 Although developed nations are hardly the central focus in development studies, they
do serve  as  examples  of  advanced states  of  development,  as  the  word “developed”
naturally  suggests.  In  the  developed  world,  public  policy  dialogue  has  featured  an
overarching theme and (once)  a  shared social  ideal,  i.e.  the welfare state,  although
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nations had different tales to tell of their experiences of it5. After its rise and its fall,
within  a  hundred  years,  what  a  welfare  state  actually  is,  however,  has  become
increasingly uncertain, and its true meaning remains illusive and little scrutinised.
3 What are we really referring to when we talk about a welfare state? In very simple
terms, we may just mean the social (welfare) functions of any government. However,
we would tend to exclude a good many nations when we come to decide which could be
considered  welfare  states.  It  seems  that  the  label  has  a  more  symbolic  meaning.
Although the real picture is not always as rosy and just as the ideal implies6, this kind
of state plays a pivotal role in promoting the welfare of its citizens, while the provision
of welfare carries major weight in state affairs.  This conception has to do with the
relative importance allotted to the various functions of a government. Calling a country
a  welfare  state  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  state  does  not  care  about  the
country’s economy, politics, defence (or warfare) or other kinds of public affairs. But it
does indicate an outstanding position adopted by the state on welfare provision in the
light of historical and cross-national comparisons. 
4 A review of Morris’  framework of a policy system is in order here. By taking social
policies as  guiding principles for public  action,  Morris  discerns several  elements or
dimensions that affect both their evolution and implementation. These include: a) a
society’s aspirations or goals; b) social  norms or “societal  policy”;  c)  a guide to the
priority aims and preferred means of the policy system, or “general public policy”; d)
sectoral public policy (e.g., income security, housing, health, personal social services,
the family domain, and the aged); e) the leadership role played by governmental units
in moving beyond or modifying social norms; f) advocated vs. adopted policy; and g)
criteria  for  assessing  policy  guidelines  (e.g.,  charity  vs.  rights  or  middle-class
viewpoints, and distributive-regulative vs. redistributive)7.  While there may be some
problems  with  the  completeness  and  logical  arrangements  of  this  framework,  the
concept articulated by Morris of a “general public policy” as a guide to the priority
aims and preferred means of the policy system is of particular interest. A review of the
literature  indicates  that,  while  issues  on  other  dimensions  or  elements  have  been
extensively studied, this aspect of the policy system has received little, if any, attention
from  policy  and  other  researchers,  including  Morris  himself.  Yet  this  guide  is  so
important  that  an  inquiry  that  is  blind  to  general  public  policy  may  simply  cause
confusion  in  cross-national  studies.  In  practice,  the  world  must  pay  most  serious
attention to this  if  it  is  to  avoid repeating the numerous tragedies caused by state
policies throughout human history. 
5 As the welfare state has taken centre stage in public policy dialogue in the West, the
field of social or welfare policy has often been placed in the spotlight. For many Third
World countries, however, it seems that neither the ratios of social spending nor the
foci of attention of their governments prove the idea of a welfare state as pertinent to
their  practice.  Therefore,  the welfare state should only be regarded as  a  particular
rather than universal general public policy. Policy researchers are thus faced with the
fundamental  task of  identifying other general  public  policy patterns that  have also
existed. Yet while the Third World is frequently the subject of development studies, it
has carried little, if any, weight in social policy discourse, even in a new theoretical
framework  as  broad  and  influential  as  the  “three  worlds  of  welfare  capitalism”
introduced by Esping-Andersen8.
The economic state and the case of the PRC
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6 The issue of under-representing the Third World in social policy may not only hold
back  its  development  but  also  leave  the  welfare  states  helpless  for  the  lack  of
comparisons  and alternatives,  as  is  the  case  when under-representing the latter  in
development studies. As a result, a more comprehensive guide for public policy and
development study may never be found. The issue is  particularly bothersome when
dealing  with  socialist-communist  states  and  those  in  transition  from  socialism-
communism.  Many  researchers  have  explicitly  limited  their  discussions  about  the
welfare state to (mainly) capitalist societies9, and Esping-Andersen notes that a social
order such as state socialism “has little use for a welfare state”10. However, not all have
implied that the welfare state is not applicable to socialist-communist societies. Some
have simply used the term(s) “(socialist) welfare state” in their study of Third World
countries, despite the unresolved theoretical troubles of the welfare state in the West11.
7 No new conceptual model promising more relevance to the development of the Third
World was available or taken seriously until the “economic state” was uncovered12. The
economic  state  is  not  just  another  label,  nor  simply  a  different  societal  ideal.  By
examining the PRC as  a  particular,  socialist  example,  the uniqueness  of  the typical
economic state has been revealed in terms of fundamental differences, when compared
to the welfare states, in its policy system as well as socio-economic and governance
structures/functional  prescriptions.  For  instance,  the  Chinese  classical  socialist
economic  state  showed evidence  of  domination  by  a  wide  variety  of  economic
departments, which represented major structural differences from any welfare state
government. The economic state can also be defined in functional terms as a state in
which the economy is promoted largely by the organised efforts of the government
rather than by private institutions. In other words, it is a state that assumes primary
responsibility for the development of the economy (just as the ideal welfare state does
for social welfare). The label “economic state” points to the fact that the state plays a
pivotal role in promoting the economy, and economic administration carries major
weight in state affairs. To know why social welfare policy was so underdeveloped in a
socialist country such as China, one must further understand the economic state from
the standpoint of a Stalinist “big push” development strategy13. That strategy places
top priority on developing the economy, particularly the means of production or the
advancement of “heavy industry”14. Other state affairs, such as social welfare, had to be
justified by their role in helping to promote productive forces and/or developing the
economic infrastructure. Understandably, the main way of providing social welfare was
through  a  model  “perfectly”  integrated  with  the  economy,  which  in  China  was  a
welfare system based almost completely on occupation—or danwei (work unit)15—that
went  beyond  the  wildest  imaginings  of  Mishra  concerning  an  integrated  welfare
state16. 
8 In  sum,  just  like  the  welfare  state,  the  economic  state  is  also  about  the  relative
importance of various functions of a government, but its priority aims and preferred
means are economic (or, when applied to people, work-related). It suggests that, by
historical  and  cross-national  comparisons,  the  state  has  adopted  an  outstanding
position  on  economic  administration.  This  position,  in  turn,  affects  policy  and
development in other areas, particularly in the social (welfare) sector. 
Developmental(ist) vs. non-developmental(ist) states: Importance and further analysis
of general public policy
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9 In view of the dilemmas arising in the practice of Western welfare states and the many
unanswered questions concerning developing nations, the significance of the discovery
of  the  economic  state general  public  policy  can  hardly  be  overstated.  Yet  that
significance  does  not  stop  there;  as  we  continue  to  examine  and  reflect  on  other
general public policy patterns in world history, clarification is lent to the difference
between a general public policy and a development strategy.
10 Compared  with  a  “development  strategy”,  a  general  public  policy  does  not  take
development for granted,  as that universal  assumption could be misleading.  In real
terms,  presuming  that  development  (in  its  typical  sense)  always  proceeds  in  the
interests of a government may not only be ignorant but also dangerous. In other words,
the existence of non-developmental or even anti-developmental general public policies
must be recognised and their causes carefully studied so that they may be prevented or
stopped. In addition to the impact of various and conflicting political  interests,  the
irrational aspects of policy-making, the role of misinformation, misunderstanding, and
the emotional reactions of individuals, groups and society as a whole that affect the
general public policy of a state have recently been pointed out
17
. In China, for example,
the party-state has made (and, albeit reluctantly, admitted) many major mistakes that
went against its own interests. The most fundamental, if not implicit, of these was to
stray  from its  main  mandate  as  an  economic  state.  In  general,  development  as  an
implied purpose, either in the economic or social sense, for a nation-state is not always
valid, hence the world dichotomy between “developing” and “developed” countries. In
that  sense,  the  economic  state  and  the  welfare  state  may  both  be  considered
developmental states, while the warfare and political-ideological states tend to be non-
developmental  or  counterproductive  in  nature.  While  it  is  possible  to  debate  the
general public policy of any state, it is only in the cases of developmental states that we
can discuss different “development strategies”, otherwise we may just be unwittingly
delivering futile talks about particular “developmental” issues.  The identification of
specific general public policy patterns should therefore be the first step undertaken in
social policy and developmental research towards gaining a comprehensive view of the
“forest” before we end up surrounded by the “trees”.
11 While “priorities” and “preferences” may appear to be minor technical concerns in
certain fields, their consequences in public policy can be grave and devastating and
their causes may be complex and hard to alter. Eventually, the states themselves will
have to reap what they have sown. For example, the political-ideological orientation of
the world’s socialist-communist states at their birth was not totally unreasonable since
most of them were conceived in war and revolution, but its prolonged domination by a
merciless  dictatorship  left  little  room  for  development.  The  Soviet  Union  and  its
Eastern European allies ended as the “communist empire” broke up and they dumped
the  Marxism-Leninism  they  had  practised  for  decades—a  sad  story  indeed  for  the
international socialist-communist movement. In China, the intense politicisation of the
economic state also brought the country to the edge of collapse. The signs of crisis had
repeatedly  prompted  the  government  to  attend  to  its  main  responsibility,  that  is,
economic construction. However, it was only after Chairman Mao’s demise, with his
successors envisaging the total failure of the Cultural Revolution, that the window of
opportunity to “transfer” its focus to economic work was opened. The expected and
unexpected successes of de-politicisation and economicisation, in turn, reaffirmed the
new leadership’s  conviction in an out-and-out  economic state  (even though reform
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immediately  started  a  structural  and  functional  de-economicisation).  Indeed,  the
achievements  of  the  opening  up  and  reform  policies  since  1978  would  have  been
impossible  without  a  determined  general  public  policy  focusing  on  economic
construction  (instead  of  the  repetition  of  political  crusades  such  as  the  Cultural
Revolution  once  every  few  years,  as  Mao  had  speculated).  It  seems  that  a  timely
adjustment  of  the  state’s  general  public  policy  is  a  matter  of  life  and  death.  The
implementation of a general public policy will have its effect over time and in the long
run control the lot of the state. Historians may see socialism in China as having failed
completely, but at least the Chinese case shows that the failure was largely attributable
to the damaging politicisation of its general public policy, or poor politics, while the
economic state and its state-dependent economic system never really enjoyed a good
chance of being systematically tested. (This does not mean that economic reform was
unnecessary,  but  the  situation  could  have  been  very  different  if  the  state  had
functioned fully as an economic state from the start.)
12 From the lessons of non-developmental vs. developmental public policies, we can draw
two conclusions. The first is that, when evaluating and predicting a policy system, we
will not arrive at a germane understanding and sensible conclusion unless and until we
have  analysed  its  general  public  policy.  After  embarking  on  the  reform  path,  the
Chinese state has probably faced no less criticism than before for failing to eliminate,
and perhaps even for generating more, social issues, including increasing inequality,
stagnating  political  progress,  and  diminishing  social  protection  of  its  citizens18.
However, the economic state has impressed the world with a stunning and continued
high growth rate. And, after two decades of almost exclusive focus on the economy, it
has  put  itself  in  a  position  to  be  able  to  address  those  social  issues  more  actively
(although that approach is still likely to be combined with economic interests)19. De-
politicisation has already improved Chinese political life by reducing the impact of bad
politics (although changing it to little or no degree despite the party-state’s increasing
efforts  to  fight  corruption  and  at  limited  political  reform).  If  re-politicisation  is
required to pursue democracy,  it  may also reopen the door to bad politics.  In that
sense, re-politicisation contains both great opportunities and enormous dangers that
have  the  potential  to  push  China  forward  or  roll  the  country  back  on  its  road  to
development, particularly when people are unprepared for it. It should be noted that
establishing a focus on the economy was never easy, and was almost tantamount to a
regime change. Upholding it could prove even harder. Indeed, the post-Mao leaders
have had to be very resilient in the face of strong resistance from the Leftists as they
have sought to get rid of the old political-ideological state and stick to its new general
public policy as an economic state, although the process (and the need for “stability”)
has undoubtedly also repressed democratic political activists.  That determination of
policy, drawing on the painful past experience of lost economic opportunities (as well
as on current personal, factional and Party interests, etc., of course), can be considered
the most fundamental “Chinese characteristic” of the recent development. Indeed, to
develop the economy the leaders have left no stone unturned, even at the cost of other
aspects of social life, including encouragement for everybody “jumping into the sea”
(going into business). Many post-communist countries, including Russia20. are no less
open, reformist  and  capitalistic  than  China  in  recent  years,  but  the  remarkable
differences in the respective economic outcomes should be attributed, at least in large
part, to the differences in their general public policies. Without persistently putting its
shoulder to the economic wheel with hard-devised strategies that will assure victory, a
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reformist leadership may accomplish no more than lip service, or disservice, through
endless economic and political chaos. 
13 The  second  point  is  that  people  and  future  leaders  should  be  educated  about  the
importance of the general public policy of their state so that they may closely monitor
and influence policy at that high level with a keen awareness and thus prevent it from
falling into non-developmental  paths.  This  can be done in multiple ways,  including
structural  alterations  in  the  government,  changes  in  state  spending  priorities,  and
ideological shifts in leading/misleading the public.  The point is that no matter how
important a general public policy is to politicians, it is the people that have the highest
stake in it. In this regard, the notion of development as a right declared by the United
Nations in 1986 should be heeded
21
. Recently, for instance, some figures who questioned
the move by the United States towards war against Iraq were pressured off the political
scene.  This  is  not  surprising  even  in  a  Western  democracy  if  the concerns  were
considered  only  as  particular,  sectoral  policy-making  issues  with  immediate
consequences in international relations. However, if they were expressed in terms of
the  general  public  policy  and  whether  the  country  would  be  led  down  a  non-
developmental  path,  then  the  close  monitoring  and  questioning  would  be  fully
legitimised. As the people have the right to development, they have the right to be
concerned about  the general  public  policy of  their  state  and of  other  states  in  the
world,  for  these  will  no  doubt  affect  their  lives  in  a  global  environment.  In  his
examination of the limitation of national interventionism in the United States, Waddell
notices that in the 1980s there was a revival of a strong warfare/weak welfare paradigm
for state power
22
. The concern in the case of Iraq is, on the surface, one of whether the
Iraqi general public policy is anti-developmental in both a national and international
sense and whether a regime change could be justified, as in Afghanistan, and how. The
deeper issue is whether warfare will take control of the general public policies of the
nation-states  and  bring  about  more  rather  than  fewer  non-developmental  cases  or
periods
23
.  This discussion would be more meaningful than general talks on peace vs.
war
24
. Another example is that the American media is also accustomed to something
called the “China threat” in the military sense. From the perspectives of general public
policy  and  the  economic  state,  however,  the  real  threat  in  the  post-Cold  War
environment has  become an economic one,  ever  since China switched to  a  “strong
economy/weak politics/weak warfare” paradigm for state power.  The most  obvious
evidence is its ending of the Cultural Revolution and its bold measures to unilaterally
cut  its  armed forces (by one million under Deng Xiaoping and half  a  million again
under his successor Jiang Zemin).  While the American state is devoting much of its
attention  to  warfare  and  ideological  issues  such  as  human  (political)  rights,  the
depoliticised Chinese state has focused almost exclusively on “economic construction”
by emphasising (economic) development as a human right and, albeit implicitly, the
right of the economic state. It is predicted that the GDP of China will surpass that of the
United States in 30 years
25
. This difference in the general public policies of the nations
will not be able to facilitate the process unless changes (forced or conscious) take place
in either or both of them.
Welfare state vs. economic state: The issue of “isms” vs. emphases
14 The  welfare  state  and  the  economic  state,  as  well  as  the  warfare,  political  and
ideological states, reflect different guides to the priority aims and preferred means of
the policy system. The question is how selective emphases on political, economic and
General Public Policy and Development Strategy
China Perspectives, 48 | july- august 2003
6
social ends and means characterise a nation’s public and social policy. The study of
general public policy is first concerned with the non-developmental vs. developmental
nature of a policy system. Although there is always a mix and no pure pattern will be
found in reality,  some theoretical  archetypes (e.g.  the warfare,  political-ideological,
welfare  and  economic  states)  and  practical  paradigms  (e.g.  the  American  strong
warfare/weak  welfare  and  the  post-Mao  Chinese  strong  economy/weak  politics
models) can be identified. It should be noted that the recognition of different general
public policy patterns, particularly the classification of practical paradigms, may be a
matter of academic controversy and even political confrontation. For instance, some
Americans  and  others  may  argue  that  American  governments  often,  if  sometimes
forced  to,  put  at  least  moderate  emphasis  on  the  stimulation  of  economic  growth.
Likewise, the United States is also strong on ideology and politics, hence a potentially
more complex but pertinent public policy paradigm of strong warfare/strong ideology-
politics/moderate economy/weak welfare for state power. It should also be noted that
the  meaning  of  the  theoretical  archetypes  and  the  characterisation  of  practical
paradigms are constantly changing or developing, as should our understanding. For
instance, the Chinese economic state has been attributed very different importance in
the post-Mao era compared with the Mao era.  Its  practical  policy paradigm shifted
from strong politics/vague economy and welfare (so to speak) to strong economy/weak
politics/weak warfare/weak welfare/weak everything else (though after a two-decade-
long focus on the economy, the state is now in a better position to get strong in the
other areas).  Moreover, although it is common sense that economy and welfare are
important in development (in different ways) while politics/ideology and warfare can
be detrimental to it, their characterisation of the policy system, as they represent the
dominating general public policy, cannot be taken straightforwardly as developmental
or  non-developmental.  There  are  just  and unjust  wars,  and  politics  may  hinder  or
liberate productive forces. For instance, although confrontations are often costly (and
destructive),  while  they  are  overbearing  they  will  seldom  gain  appreciation  and
reciprocal  benefits  (even  in  cases  where  international  policing  or  peace-keeping  is
needed)26. However, from a long-term point of view, there is historical evidence that
the economic and welfare states can be considered developmental states while warfare
and political-ideological states are non-developmental or counterproductive.
15 The  economic  state  and  the  welfare  state  as  different  general  public  policies  can
therefore  be  considered as  having different  development  strategies.  Because  of  the
importance  of  the  general  public  policy  in  its  effect  on  all  sectoral  policies,  the
problems we face in developmental studies are firstly issues confronting the different
policy  paradigms.  Here  we  are  not  talking  about  different  “policy  regimes”.  The
Chinese case shows that de-politicisation has largely resulted in the ideological issue of
socialism vs. capitalism giving way to a practical concern over emphases (priorities and
preferences)  and  balances  in  the  strategic  plans  of  the  nation  for  development,
particularly in view of Deng’s will  concerning “no argument”27.  The Party-state has
shifted  away  from  doctrinaire  communism  to  a  “socialist  road  with  Chinese
characteristics”. Chinese communists, of course, would hardly accept such a label as
pragmatism  for  what  they  have  been  doing,  though  switching  from  dogmatism  to
pragmatism was necessary for de-politicisation. Today’s pursuit of this socialism with
Chinese characteristics, with the emphasis on “Chinese characteristics” rather than on
“isms”, is a result of the simply too high historical price the state has paid in the past.
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16 Western  welfare  states  are  at  a  similar  crossroads28.  While  a  claim of  “the  end  of
ideology” is hardly ever true, there has been a consensus that the welfare state is in
trouble and that the deep-seated issue is firstly economic rather than ideological. This
serious  developmental  issue  has  led  to  a  Western-wide  movement  towards  welfare
reform, which is also part of the reason why China will not become a welfare state, at
least in the near future. In the United States, both Democrats and Republicans agreed
to “end welfare as we know it”, and former President Clinton (a Democrat) signed the
welfare  reform  bill  into  law  in  1996  (the  Personal  Responsibility  and  Work
Opportunities  Reconciliation Act).  American mainstream opinion is  that “only work
works”, thus the main approach to welfare reform is to move people “from welfare to
work”. However, this reform has not produced its expected effects29. The key is that
pro-work welfare reform requires a good economy30. In fact, the idea of workfare is
nothing new,  and the reliance on behavioural  change has  never  been successful  in
addressing welfare as an economic issue. If we look at China, the lesson is different but
bears on the same point. Just as the dilemmas of the welfare state have led to welfare
reform,  the  problems of  the  economic  state  have  led  to  economic  reform.  Yet  the
Chinese experience shows that work has not worked, as putting all the people into an
overstaffed economy and getting them to “eat out of the same big pot” only held down
productivity.  In  a  sense,  the  Chinese  approach  to  economic  reform  by  accepting
unemployment and emphasising the building of a differentiated “social security” net in
terms of a “serialised reform” (rhetorical at the beginning but more serious recently)
can be characterised as a movement in the opposite direction—“from work to welfare”.
Although China  has  headed towards  a  “socialist  welfare  pluralism” without  a  state
welfare  system  comparable  to  its  Western  counterparts31.  the  Chinese  experience
provides important suggestions from the other end of the scale as to how far Western
welfare  reform  can  go.  Studies  of  socialist  welfare  in  Eastern  Europe  also  contain
similar implications32.
17 In a sense, the Chinese economic reform was a successful welfare reform, as it firstly
separated  statutory  welfare  from  the  economy  and  started  treating  business  as
business—with phenomenal results33. In contrast, Western welfare reform has not been
a successful economic reform since it has not found an effective way to link welfare
with work. This certainly has important implications for Mishra’s differentiated and
integrated  welfare  models  in  terms  of  which  one  is  actually  more  feasible  and
advantageous34. Yet the broader lesson to be shared by the welfare and economic states
is that welfare reform and economic reform must go hand in hand. And the primacy of
the economy in development must be recognised and reflected35, however differently,
in the general public policies or development strategies of both economic and welfare
states. In this regard, a concern over the preoccupation among Third World states with
“economism” and the focus of the United Nations on social as opposed to economic
development36,  although  they  certainly  have  a  point  to  them,  may  also  mirror  a
“Western ethnocentrism” that has not proven very helpful to either the Third World or
the welfare states themselves.
The future of the welfare and economic states and the “socialist road with Chinese
characteristics”
18 As a result of the seemingly irresolvable crisis, some Westerners have already declared
the end of the post-war welfare state37. Others talk about its resilience in the face of
current challenges38 and argue that the welfare state will continue to spread around
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the world39.  These declarations, however, can hardly be fruitful without a new path
being mapped out for the economic future of the welfare state. In this regard, attention
needs to be paid to a recent effort that attempts to (re)introduce to social policy in the
West  the  idea  of  development  in  its  basic  economic  sense.  Some  do  it  through
promoting  “positive  welfare”40 or  the  building  of  a  “sustainable  welfare  state” 41.
Others explore the possible ways out open to the welfare state in terms of  various
“third ways” (between capitalism and socialism, or a “right mix between the private
market and state intervention”)42. Among the scholars, an outstanding advocate of the
developmental approach to the future of the welfare state is Midgley43. This approach
gives a new meaning to social development that is not opposed to but combines social
welfare  with  economic  development,  resulting  in  such  innovative  ideas  as
developmental social programmes or “developmental welfare”. These concepts engage
the economic notion of social capital that is adapted from the welfare idea of social
support networks44. By illustrating the case for and against the redistribution of social
welfare  and  the  current  hegemonic  influence  exerted  by  neo-liberalism  on  social
policy, Midgley highlights the emphasis placed by social development on productivism
and social investment and illuminates a comprehensive strategy for promoting social
welfare45.  This  strategy  of  redistribution  through  social  investment  involves  the
following  aspects:  increasing  cost  effectiveness  in  social  welfare,  enhancing  human
capital  investments,  promoting  social  capital  formation,  developing  individual  and
community assets, facilitating economic participation through productive employment
and  self-employment,  removing  barriers  to  economic  participation,  and  creating  a
social  climate  conducive  to  development.  This  groundbreaking  effort  actually
transforms the meaning of social welfare and constitutes a rather radical proposal for a
shift in the general public policies of developed nations from a typical redistributive
welfare state to a new focus on social investment that facilitates, rather than impedes,
economic development. This proposed departure from the welfare state represents, in
a sense, a step towards the economic state, and here the experience of Third World
development becomes highly relevant. This down-to-earth approach, in turn, provides
a better example for the Third World to follow in advancing its welfare arrangements,
not  with  the  old  redistributive  welfare  state  nor  in  the  neo-liberal  sense  of
development, but in accordance with its primary concern about the economy coupled
with a desire for matching social improvement. 
19 On the other hand, the case of the PRC is the history of the extreme politicisation and
then de-politicisation of an economic state that has finally embarked full speed ahead
on development, which has taught the leaders a fundamental lesson about not allowing
their general public policy to revert to a non-developmental path via re-politicisation.
Bearing in mind the painful losses China now realises it suffered and a current urgent
need to catch up with the rest of the world, Chinese general public policy will continue
to be implemented in such a way that China remains a determined economic state for
the  foreseeable  future.  Nevertheless,  there  has  been  a  rapid  process  of  de-
economicisation among central and local authorities as a result of economic reform,
which,  coupled  with  the  ongoing  de-politicisation,  may  be  considered  a  gradual
deconstruction  of  the  Chinese  state  in  recent  years.  However,  as  suggested  by  its
success in the past two decades, the primacy of the economic state in development
must be maintained by the constant rebalancing of public policy foci to achieve goals,
which is instructive not only for the Chinese but also for the welfare states. To deal
with various social issues in development, the economic state can also learn from the
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historical  lessons  of  the  welfare  states,  including  the  new  trend  towards
“developmental welfare” in the West.
20 The Western and Chinese stories of their welfare and economic states show that they
have somehow moved towards each other from opposite positions, (e.g. “from welfare
to work” and “from work to welfare”). Although it is unlikely that they will share the
same ideal  dynamic  point  of  balanced socio-economic development—because of  the
various structural-functional and economic, political, social. and cultural differences—
the welfare and economic states as different development strategies certainly can and
should  learn  from  each  other.  For  example,  by  comparing  China’s  planned  socio-
economic change with that of the West, a lesson can be learned that economic reform
and social (welfare) reform must go hand in hand.
21 PUBLIC policy study has suffered from a lack of models and frameworks suited to Third
World development on the one hand and the impasse in the Western welfare state on
the  other.  In  order  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  this,  Morris’
framework of the policy system is reviewed and a theoretical breakthrough is indicated
by identifying different general public policy patterns as different guides to the priority
aims and preferred means of a policy system. The Chinese case is conceptualised as an
ever-changing  economic  state,  and  the  welfare  state  as  the policy  or  development
paradigm is seriously challenged. The economic state and the welfare state reflect the
relative importance of economy/welfare in state affairs. An international and historical
view is required to understand and apply these models. The practical paradigm of the
Chinese  state  in  the  post-Mao  era  is  further  spelled  out  as  strong  economy/weak
politics, in contrast with the US strong warfare/weak welfare paradigm. These can be
expanded  as  a  post-Mao  Chinese  policy  orientation  towards  strong  economy/weak
everything  else  (e.g.  politics,  warfare  and  welfare)  set  against  the  pattern  for  the
United  States  that  is  characterised  by  strong  warfare/strong  politics-ideology/
moderate  economy  (compared  to  China)/weak  welfare.  The  difference  between
development strategy and the general public policy is indicated, and the importance of
studying different and conflicting general public policies is underscored. In evaluating
and predicting a policy system, a germane understanding and sensible conclusion is
impossible unless and until we have analysed the general public policy of that system.
By  recognising  warfare  and  political-ideological  states  as  likely  to  have  non-
developmental  or  counterproductive  general  public  policies,  the  meaning  of  a
“developmental  state”  can  better  be  understood  under  the  new  comparative
framework. The economic state and the welfare state, where variations require further
scrutiny, classification and quantification, represent different development strategies.
They need to learn from each other. Further, there exists a right of development and a
need  for  people  to  monitor  and  prevent  government  general  public  policies  from
moving onto a non-developmental path.
22 These inquiries and findings have significant implications. Prior to the discovery of the
general  public  policy,  policy  studies  were  guided  by  existing  theories  including
traditional political economy. Yet for the Chinese, who practised socialism for decades,
socialism became more confusing and unclear to many, as did its importance. As has
been  noted,  Deng  Xiaoping,  the  “designer  general”  of  Chinese  reform  who  was
frequently labelled as a “capitalist roader” by his comrades and Westerners alike, never
abandoned his communist principles. However, he was certainly disillusioned about the
dogmatic “ism” that he had loyally followed and the associated ideological fights in
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which he had participated. His “white cat/black cat” philosophy made a fundamental
difference to his life and to China’s fate. On the other hand, capitalism has not been
able to lift all countries out of developmental and non-developmental problems (e.g.
poverty and war).  A focus on the study of different general  public policies and the
factors affecting them in all different worlds will supply much needed new insights. In
real terms, world peace can hardly be assured if the world’s citizenry is not made aware
of the danger of non-developmental general public policies and the true meaning of a
developmental state, no matter how many democratic or peace-loving individuals we
would like to recognise. Likewise, economic theories have not successfully explained
various  types  of  economic  growth,  stagnation  and  crises,  despite  the  phenomenal
advances in econometric instruments and analytical details.  The fundamental issues
will remain unanswered if the policy concepts and models illuminated in this article
are  ignored.  Among  these  is  the  “Chinese  secret”  in  development  in  terms  of  an
extraordinary economy-centred general public policy that grew out of its past mistakes
and its keen awareness of the urgency of fulfilling the state’s chief mandate.
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